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PROTECTING CHILD VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AS 
VIGOROUSLY AS CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS’ WHEN 
PROSECUTING POSSESSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
Kiel Willmore 
Abstract: Among the devastating effects of the worldwide child pornography epidemic is 
a concerning legal dilemma. Until recently, courts have frequently held that a defendant 
charged with child pornography offenses has a nearly unrestricted right to receive and view 
copies of the pornographic evidence as part of discovery of the state’s evidence. The 
duplication, dissemination, and viewing of child pornography is not only a violation of 
federal law, but is also a further violation of the child victims’ privacy and renewal of their 
abuse. The Washington State Legislature recently enacted Substitute House Bill 2177 (“H.B. 
2177”), which amends the legislative findings on the child pornography epidemic, and places 
certain limits on the discovery of child pornography evidence. These limitations are found in 
the new statute RCW 9.68A.170. Washington’s law is modeled closely on the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, which has withstood numerous federal 
constitutional challenges. This Comment argues that the Washington State Supreme Court 
should uphold RCW 9.68A.170 as constitutional, and overrule its earlier decisions in State v. 
Boyd and State v. Grenning, which created a per se rule requiring the State to provide child 
pornography evidence to criminal defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Weldon Marc Gilbert enticed adolescent boys with exotic trips, rides 
in airplanes and boats, then allegedly lured them into his home where he 
filmed himself sexually abusing them.1 His case is pending before the 
Pierce County Superior Court.2 From his jail cell, Gilbert petitioned the 
court to receive both copies of his videos and a means to view them. 
Washington’s criminal discovery rules3—as construed by the 
Washington State Supreme Court in State v. Boyd4 and State v. 
                                                     
1. Christina Caron, Loophole Allows Child Rapist to Watch Child Porn, ABC NEWS, July 13, 
2011, http://abcnews.go.com/US/washington-rapist-watches-child-porn-jail-law-loophole/story?id= 
14061524#.T8m7BplYsjo; Katharine Q. Seelye, Furor Over Giving Rape Suspect Explicit Tapes, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/us/01prison.html; Timothy 
Stenovec, Weldon Marc Gilbert, Suspect in Child Rape Case, Allowed to Watch Child Pornography 
in Jail, HUFFINGTON POST, July 13, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/13/weldon-
marc-gilbert-child-porn-jail_n_897564.html. 
2. State v. Gilbert, No. 07-1-05618-3 (WA Super. Ct. Pierce County, filed Nov. 1, 2007). 
3. WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7. 
4. 160 Wash. 2d 424, 158 P.3d 54 (2007). 
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Grenning5—entitle Gilbert to receive and view a copy of the child 
pornography evidence without any showing that his viewing the 
materials is necessary to his defense.6 
Similar to Washington State law, a defendant charged in federal court 
with possession of child pornography before 2006 would routinely 
receive a copy of the pornographic evidence to review in preparation for 
trial.7 The government’s surrender of child pornography evidence results 
in several problematic consequences. Most troubling, every viewing of 
the pornography constitutes further victimization of the children 
depicted in the obscene images, regardless of whether the viewing 
occurs in preparation for trial. There is also a custody and security risk: 
once the government distributes the pornography to the defense and 
other expert witnesses, there is no guarantee that the materials will not 
be further disseminated. Even if unlikely, defense counsel and expert 
witnesses who receive the pornography risk future prosecution if they 
fail to return the evidence to the court. Another dilemma—albeit 
commonly seen as incurable—is that those prosecuting child 
pornography cases violate federal law themselves whenever they copy 
and distribute the pornographic evidence. 
The United States Congress addressed some of these troubling 
concerns by passing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 
2006 (“Walsh Act” or “Act”).8 Congress made lengthy and important 
findings regarding the unquestionable vice of child pornography, and 
recognized the need to stamp out its duplication and distribution.9 
Specifically, Congress determined that viewing child pornography 
constitutes a renewed violation of the child victims’ privacy and a 
repetition of their abuse.10 In response to these findings, Congress 
created a special exception to the discovery rules in cases involving 
child pornography. In most circumstances, the Act prohibits the 
government from reproducing the evidence and mandates securing the 
evidence in a government facility. However, the Act requires the 
government to make the materials “reasonably available” for 
examination by the defense, or else produce a copy of the pornographic 
evidence upon a showing that receiving a copy is essential to the 
                                                     
5. 169 Wash. 2d 47, 234 P.3d 169 (2010). 
6. See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d 424, 435, 158 P.3d 54, 60 (2007). 
7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E). 
8. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501, 120 Stat. 
620 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 21, 28, and 42 U.S.C). 
9. Id. at 623–24. 
10. Id. at 624. 
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defense.11 
Until 2012, Washington State law reflected the pre-2006 federal rules 
regarding the discovery of child pornography evidence.12 In Boyd and 
Grenning, the Washington State Supreme Court held that under the 
Washington State Superior Court Criminal Rules (CrR), the State had a 
duty to provide the defense with copies of the child pornography 
evidence that it intended to use at trial.13 The Court reasoned that 
denying the defendant this evidence not only violated court rules, but 
also implicated the defendant’s right to due process.14 
The Washington State Legislature responded to the Boyd and 
Grenning decisions by enacting Substitute House Bill 2177 (“H.B. 
2177”), which took effect in July 2012.15 The Act’s legislative findings 
express a clear purpose of protecting child victims from repeated abuse 
and victimization through unnecessary dissemination of the 
pornography.16 Patterned after the Walsh Act, H.B. 2177—codified in 
part at RCW 9.68A.170—requires child pornography evidence to remain 
in the possession and control of the court or relevant law enforcement 
agency, and made “reasonably” available for either party’s 
examination.17 Where copies are necessary to a party’s case, the statute 
shifts the burden to the requesting party to make a “substantial showing” 
to the court before dissemination may be authorized.18 Without a 
substantial showing of need, the court is otherwise prohibited from 
ordering the reproduction and distribution of such evidence.19 
This Comment argues that the Washington State Supreme Court 
should overrule its decisions in Boyd and Grenning in light of 
Washington’s new discovery statute, a constitutionally valid means of 
balancing the interests of child victims and criminal defendants. Part I 
provides an overview of the Walsh Act, and federal court decisions 
                                                     
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(2)(A) (2011). 
12. See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(a). 
13. State v. Grenning, 169 Wash. 2d 47, 60–61, 234 P.3d 169, 176–77 (2010); State v. Boyd, 160 
Wash. 2d 424, 432–33, 158 P.3d 54, 58–59 (2007). 
14. See Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 433–35, 158 P.3d at 59–60; see also Grenning, 169 Wash. 2d at 
58, 234 P.3d at 175. 
15. Substitute H.B. 2177, Chapter 135, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (codified at WASH. 
REV. CODE §§ 9.68A.001, 9.68A.170, 9.68A.180, and 9.68A.190); see also History of H.B. 2177, 
WASH. ST. LEGISLATURE, http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/summary.aspx?bill=2177 (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2012). The state Senate passed the bill 46–0, and the House passed the bill 95 to 0. Id. 
16. Substitute H.B. 2177 § 1. 
17. Id. § 2(1)–(2); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.170. 
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.170(4). 
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.170(2). 
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upholding the Walsh Act as constitutional. Part II describes how the 
Washington State Supreme Court previously addressed a defendant’s 
right to this child pornography evidence in Boyd and Grenning. Part III 
details the Washington State Legislature’s response to Boyd and 
Grenning: H.B. 2177. Part IV argues that H.B. 2177’s discovery 
limitations under RCW 9.68A.170 comply with the constitutional 
requirements of due process and right to counsel, further state legislative 
goals of protecting children and combating child pornography, and are 
consistent with other provisions of the Washington State Constitution. 
I. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE UPHELD THE WALSH ACT’S 
LIMITATIONS ON A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S 
DISCOVERY RIGHTS 
When determining whether RCW 9.68A.170 comports with a 
defendant’s rights of due process and effective assistance of counsel, the 
Washington State Supreme Court should look to the statute’s roots in the 
Walsh Act, and the various federal courts opinions upholding the Act. 
Generally, a criminal defendant in federal court may examine physical 
evidence in the government’s possession in preparation for trial. Before 
2006 this included child pornography evidence. In 2006 Congress 
enacted the Walsh Act, which excluded child pornography from this 
general discovery rule. Challenges asserting that the Walsh Act facially 
violates a defendant’s due process rights—coupled with arguments 
regarding a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel—have unanimously failed.20 Numerous federal courts have 
upheld the constitutionality of the Walsh Act’s discovery restrictions, 
limitations that are nearly identical to those under RCW 9.68A.170. 
A. Congress Enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 
of 2006, Closing the Loophole That Permitted Dissemination of 
Child Pornography Evidence During Discovery 
In federal court, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 16 
governs the parties’ discovery and inspection of evidence in criminal 
proceedings.21 The rule permits the defendant to copy or photograph 
                                                     
20. See, e.g., United States v. Shrake, 515 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding statute as 
facially constitutional); United States v. Spivack, 528 F. Supp. 2d 103, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); United 
States v. Johnson, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1018–19 (N.D. Iowa 2006); see also United States v. 
Sturm, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (D. Colo. 2007) (holding that the defense’s increased cost does 
not render counsel’s performance deficient). 
21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. 
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evidence in the government’s possession if the item is material to 
preparing the defense, the government intends to use the item at trial, or 
the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant.22 These items 
may include books, papers, documents, data, and other tangible 
objects.23 In cases involving child pornography24 charges, courts have 
held that a hard drive containing pornographic media qualifies as data, 
photographs, or tangible objects subject to this discovery rule.25 Rule 16 
required the government to produce mirror-image copies of such hard 
drives to defendants who requested them in preparation for trial.26 This 
duplication and dissemination contravenes federal law that prohibits any 
person from knowingly possessing, reproducing, and distributing child 
pornography.27 
To prevent such discovery, Congress passed the Walsh Act in 2006.28 
The act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (“§ 3509”)—the applicable statutory 
provisions on discovery—to include subsection (m), which requires the 
court or the government to retain control of materials that constitute 
child pornography in criminal proceedings.29 In passing the Act, 
Congress made the following findings: 
(A) The vast majority of child pornography prosecutions today 
involve images contained on computer hard drives, computer 
disks, and related media. 
(B) Child pornography is not entitled to protection under the 
First Amendment and thus may be prohibited. 
(C) The government has a compelling interest in protecting 
children from those who sexually exploit them, and this interest 
                                                     
22. Id. 16(a)(1)(E). 
23. Id. 
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2011) (“[C]hild pornography [is] any visual depiction, including 
any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether 
made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where—
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct; (B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image 
that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) 
such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 
(2002) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) as unconstitutionally overbroad). 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1091–92 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
26. See, e.g., id. 
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2011). 
28. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501, 120 Stat. 
620 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 21, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(1) (2011). 
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extends to stamping out the vice of child pornography at all 
levels in the distribution chain. 
(D) Every instance of viewing images of child pornography 
represents a renewed violation of the privacy of the victims and 
a repetition of their abuse. 
(E) Child pornography constitutes prima facie contraband, and 
as such should not be distributed to, or copied by, child 
pornography defendants or their attorneys. 
(F) It is imperative to prohibit the reproduction of child 
pornography in criminal cases so as to avoid repeated violation 
and abuse of victims, so long as the government makes 
reasonable accommodations for the inspection, viewing, and 
examination of such material for the purposes of mounting a 
criminal defense.30 
The findings outline the importance of protecting child victims 
against unnecessary duplication and dissemination of child pornography 
evidence during trial proceedings. In accordance with Congress’ 
findings, § 3509(m) prohibits the government from copying, 
photographing, duplicating, or otherwise reproducing child pornography 
in response to a criminal defendant’s discovery request, 
“[n]otwithstanding Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.”31 The statute thus removes the trial court’s discretion in 
compelling disclosure of the evidence absent a showing of need by the 
defense. 
The statute prohibits dissemination of child pornography evidence “so 
long as” the materials remain “reasonably available” to the defendant.32 
Materials are “reasonably available” where “the Government provides 
ample opportunity for inspection, viewing, and examination at a 
Government facility of the property or material by the defendant, his or 
her attorney, and any individual the defendant may seek to qualify to 
furnish expert testimony at trial.”33 How the government satisfies this 
“reasonably available” standard is discussed in the following 
subsections. 
                                                     
30. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act § 501(2)(A)–(F). 
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3509(m)(1)–(2)(A). 
32. Id. § 3509(m)(2)(A). 
33. Id. § 3509(m)(2)(B). 
Willmore -FINAL-with corrected title.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/26/2012  6:38 PM 
2012] PROTECTING CHILD VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 889 
 
B. Federal Courts Have Upheld § 3509(m) as Facially Constitutional 
Federal courts have consistently upheld the validity of § 3509(m) on 
its face after considering several challenges to the constitutionality of 
discovery burdens imposed by the statute.34 Challenges asserting that 
§ 3509(m) facially violates a defendant’s due process rights, which have 
generally been coupled with arguments regarding the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel, have unanimously failed.35 
Although these challenges are based on separate constitutional 
protections, the courts have analyzed the right to effective assistance of 
counsel “under the framework of due process”36 because it generally 
supplies broader protections than the Sixth Amendment.37 Where the 
courts have found due process to be satisfied, the opinions implicitly 
agree that a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel has been 
satisfied as well.38 
1. The Walsh Act’s “Reasonably Available” and “Ample 
Opportunity” Clauses Ensure a Defendant Due-Process-Level 
Access to Evidence Containing Child Pornography 
The primary issue regarding a defendant’s due process rights is 
whether the defendant’s access to the pornographic evidence satisfies the 
                                                     
34. See generally Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 
U.S.C.A. § 3509(m) Prohibiting Reproduction of Child Pornography Used as Evidence in Criminal 
Trials, 47 A.L.R. FED. 2d 25 (2010) (providing a general analysis of each of the challenges to the 
Walsh Act’s constitutionality). The courts have considered challenges regarding several 
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Shrake, 515 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 2008) (due 
process); United States v. Battaglia, No. 5:07cr0055, 2007 WL 1831108 (N.D. Ohio June 25, 2007) 
(ex post facto); United States v. Spivack, 528 F. Supp. 2d 103, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (separation of 
powers). 
35. See, e.g., Shrake, 515 F.3d at 745; United States v. Johnson, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 
(N.D. Iowa 2006) (finding that the limitations on a defendant’s discovery right are proper in light of 
Congress’s express desire through the Walsh Act to prevent unnecessary distribution of child 
pornography); see also United States v. Sturm, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1027 (D. Colo. 2007) 
(holding that the defense’s “increased cost and inconvenience” alone does not “ipso facto render the 
assistance of counsel deficient, much less so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness”). 
36. See Spivack, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 105. 
37. United States v. O’Rourke, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1054 n.2 (D. Ariz. 2007). 
38. See, e.g., id. at 1055 n.2; Spivack, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 105–09; Battaglia, 2007 WL 1831108, 
at *4; see also Kletter, supra note 34, at § 2 (“In most cases, the courts consider these challenges 
under the umbrella of due process rather than address each constitutional provision. The gist of the 
due process challenge is that [the Act] deprives the defendant of a fair trial in restricting the defense 
team’s full access to the alleged pornography. In response to this argument, the courts have 
universally held, as of this writing, that [the Act] is facially constitutional . . . .”). 
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“reasonably available” clause of § 3509(m)(2)(A).39 The statute states 
that the government has made the pornographic evidence reasonably 
available if it has provided “ample opportunity” to the defendant to 
inspect it at a government facility.40 Applying the rules of statutory 
construction, courts have held that § 3509(m) comports with due process 
on its face because the statute’s “reasonably available” and “ample 
opportunity” clauses act as safety valves that protect a defendant’s due 
process rights.41 Courts have reasoned that where the evidence is not 
made reasonably available, the statute itself requires the government to 
produce copies of the child pornography evidence.42 
The United States District Court of Arizona was one of the first courts 
to interpret the “ample opportunity” clause in United States v. 
O’Rourke.43 Applying the canons of construction, the court looked to the 
plain meaning44 of “ample” to interpret the clause, stating: 
[Ample opportunity] would mean a more than adequate 
opportunity to inspect, view, and examine the evidence in 
question. Such an opportunity is akin to the due process 
requirement that a criminal defendant be afforded “fair 
opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations” and be 
free from “arbitrary or disproportionate” restrictions on his right 
to confront witnesses and present evidence. The plain meaning 
of the statutory language thus appears to be consistent with the 
requirements of due process.45 
The court determined that the government had to give the defendant at 
least “due-process-level access” or otherwise provide a copy to the 
defense.46 Such an opportunity affords the defendant a fair opportunity 
                                                     
39. See United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 614 (9th Cir. 2010) (determining that whether a 
defendant’s constitutional rights were violated under the Act hinged on whether the Government 
made the evidence containing child pornography reasonably available to the defendant); see also 
Shrake, 515 F.3d at 745 (dismissing defendant’s claim because he made no showing that the child 
pornography evidence was not made reasonably available to him). 
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(2)(B) (2011). 
41. See, e.g., Spivack, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 106 (summarizing several federal cases that have 
construed the “ample opportunity” clause to ensure defendant due-process-level access). 
42. See, e.g., O’Rourke, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1055; see also United States v. Knellinger, 471 
F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
43. 470 F. Supp. 2d 1049. 
44. The court referred to Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 39 (1981), which defines “ample” 
as “generous or more than adequate in size, scope, or capacity.” 
45. O’Rourke, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1056 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Chambers 
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991)). 
46. Id. 
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to defend against his charges and thus comports with due process—both 
facially and as applied.47 Most courts have followed O’Rourke’s 
reasoning and likewise found § 3509(m) comports with due process.48 
2. Federal Courts Have Used a Number of Factors to Evaluate 
Whether Discovery Limitations Satisfy Due Process Under the 
Ample-Opportunity Standard 
Courts have considered several factors to determine whether a 
defendant has received ample opportunity—thus satisfying due 
process—to inspect the evidence. Those factors include the following: 
location, time allotted for analysis, hours of access, privacy, availability 
of experts willing to work at a government facility, and cost of moving 
an expert’s equipment to the location. A summary of specific 
circumstances the courts have found to satisfy ample opportunity is 
provided below: 
 
Location Courts have allowed materials depicting child pornography 
to be stored at a U.S. Attorney’s Office,49 an FBI forensics 
facility,50 a U.S. Marshall’s Office,51 and a local sheriff’s 
office,52 even if those facilities are located in a state other 
than where the defense counsel or experts are located.53 
                                                     
47. Id. at 1055–56 (holding that the statute cannot be unconstitutional as applied because the 
defense is entitled to receive a copy of the child pornography evidence whenever the defense is not 
afforded ample opportunity to examine the materials). 
48. See, e.g., United States v. Spivack, 528 F. Supp. 2d 103, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding ample 
opportunity as at least coterminous with constitutional due process); see also United States v. 
Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (E.D. Va. 2007) (requiring the defense to have at a minimum 
the same opportunity to review the evidence as mandated by the federal Constitution, else 
§ 3509(m) would be facially unconstitutional). But see United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 615–
17 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the opportunity to define “ample opportunity” beyond its plain 
meaning and determining that the defendant had ample opportunity to inspect the evidence when it 
was available for review in a U.S. Attorney’s office for over fourteen months before trial, despite 
the defendant’s claims that his counsel could not adequately examine the evidence due to budget, 
timing, and staffing problems). 
49. Wright, 625 F.3d at 614. 
50. Spivack, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 108. 
51. O’Rourke, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. 
52. United States v. Bortnick, No. 08–20151–CM, 2010 WL 935842, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 
2010). 
53. See O’Rourke, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1052, 1058 (holding that the hardship of defense counsel’s 
out-of-state traveling to Arizona from Ohio did not implicate due process) (citing United States v. 
Johnson, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1020 (N.D. Iowa 2006)); accord United States v. Doane, 501 F. 
Supp. 2d 897, 902 (E.D. Ky. 2007). 
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This is a discretionary issue that depends heavily on the 
amount of discovery and the time necessary for the defense 
to prepare for trial. Examples include: 
 
O’Rourke: The defense had approximately ten days to 
conduct its analysis of forty-six movie files and several 
hundred still images.54 The defense experts used only four 
and a half hours, and the court found this sufficient.55  
 
Wright: The defense had access to a mirror-image copy of a 
hard drive for fourteen months leading up to trial.56 The 
discovery included a total of thirteen files of child 
pornography.57 Despite a series of complaints by the expert 
and defense counsel regarding budget and staffing issues as 
trial approached, the court found that the defendant had an 
ample opportunity to review the materials.58 
Hours of 
access 
Courts have found that a defendant’s due process rights are 
satisfied where the government allows access during regular 
business hours.59 Even access outside of business hours has 
been permitted upon request.60 
Privacy Courts have generally required the defense to have access to 
a private office within the government facility, prohibited 
the government or its experts from entering, permitted 
defense experts to leave their hardware in the office, 
permitted experts to run software overnight for analysis, and 
posted the court’s order on the office door.61 The 
overarching policy of these rules is to protect the work 
product of defense counsel and defense experts.62 
                                                     
54. See O’Rourke, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1052, 1057. 
55. See id. at 1052. 
56. See United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 615 (9th Cir. 2010). 
57. See id. at 589. 
58. See id. 
59. See, e.g., id. at 615 (permitting experts to leave their equipment overnight in the government 
facility if necessary); see also United States v. Flinn, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2007) 
(approving access during business hours); accord United States v. Sturm, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 
1024 (D. Colo. 2007). 
60. Flinn, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. 
61. See, e.g., United States v. O’Rourke, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1057 (D. Ariz. 2007). 
62. See, e.g., Flinn, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (“An ample opportunity also requires that the 
analysis be performed in a situation where attorney-client privilege and work product will not be 
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The courts have unanimously determined that the plain language of 
§ 3509(m) comports with due process both facially and as applied.63 
Nonetheless, the courts have noted that even under § 3509(m)’s 
discovery limitations, the defense can compel discovery of these 
materials where the government fails to satisfy the “ample opportunity” 
clause.64 Only in a very small minority of cases, however, have the 
courts found the government’s control and possession of child 
pornography evidence so burdensome that it deprived the defendant of 
due process such that providing a copy to the defense was necessary.65 
These opinions, as discussed below, provide a sketch of what might be 
necessary to show either that the discovery limitations—location, time 
allotted for analysis, hours of access, and privacy—do not afford the 
defendant ample opportunity, or that copies of the child pornography 
evidence are necessary to the defense.66 
Two courts, in United States v. Knellinger67 and United States v. 
Tummins,68 have found ample opportunity lacking. In Knellinger, the 
defendant—charged with seven counts of child pornography 
possession—filed a motion to compel the government to furnish him a 
mirror-image copy of his hard drive, arguing that the constitution 
entitled him to a copy.69 The district court held an evidentiary hearing to 
determine the validity of § 3509(m).70 The court quickly moved its 
inquiry to the “ample opportunity” clause—referring to it as the Act’s 
“safety valve”—to determine whether the defense was entitled to a copy 
                                                     
easily, accidentally exposed to the government . . . .”). 
63. See, e.g., United States v. Shrake, 515 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Spivack, 528 F. Supp. 2d 103, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d 
640, 644 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
64. See, e.g., Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (“If ample opportunity has not been provided, 
the statute itself renders [defendant]’s as applied constitutional challenge moot because the statute 
permits the Court to provide a copy of the materials to the defense.”); see also O’Rourke, 470 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1056 (finding the statute constitutional as applied because the statute itself requires 
dissemination where ample opportunity is not afforded the defense). 
65. See, e.g., Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 648–50. 
66. See id.; see also United States v. Tummins, No. 3:10–00009, 2011 WL 2078107 (M.D. Tenn. 
May 26, 2011). As of May 16, 2012, these are the only two federal cases that have cited the Walsh 
Act’s § 3509(m) and found that dissemination of the child pornography was necessary. 
67. 471 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
68. No. 3:10-00009, 2011 WL 2078107 (M.D. Tenn. May 26, 2011). 
69. Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 642. Ironically, Knellinger’s motion to compel production 
came just days before Congress passed the Walsh Act, which the government subsequently relied on 
to deny his request. See id. 
70. Id. 
Willmore FINAL (Do Not Delete) 10/26/2012  6:38 PM 
894 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:883 
 
of the evidence.71 
To show that he had not received ample opportunity to review the 
evidence, Knellinger produced four expert witnesses—one computer 
forensic expert, two digital video experts, and an experienced child 
pornography defense attorney—to testify about the difficulties of 
conducting their examinations at a government facility.72 Although the 
computer forensic expert admitted that § 3509(m)’s limitations did not 
unduly interfere with his job, the other three witnesses testified to 
several hardships that the court used to justify its decision to compel the 
government to disclose the mirror-image hard drives.73 
Knellinger’s attorney-witness testified that a copy of the materials 
was “absolutely essential” where a defendant intends to defend against 
possession of child pornography charges using the virtual-child 
defense.74 The virtual-child defense permits a defendant to present 
evidence that the alleged pornography does not actually depict images of 
real children, but rather digitally generated children, which do not 
constitute child pornography under the law.75 Knellinger’s two video 
experts testified that analyzing the videos in a government facility would 
impose a tremendous burden on them.76 One video expert claimed that 
he would raise his normal fee from $135,000 to $540,000, plus the costs 
of moving his “quite extensive collection of equipment” necessary to 
mount that particular defense.77 He further testified that even if he were 
to move his equipment to a government facility, his work-product would 
be compromised to such a degree that he would not be able to provide 
his services effectively.78 The final witness testified similarly, and added 
that he would not agree to work on Knellinger’s case under § 3509(m)’s 
                                                     
71. Id. at 644–45 (reasoning that the statute could be facially unconstitutional only where no 
application of the ample-opportunity clause would be sufficient to protect Knellinger’s rights (citing 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987))). The court found that “ample opportunity” 
required at least a constitutionally mandated opportunity to inspect the evidence, and thus dismissed 
Knellinger’s facial constitutional challenges. Id. 
72. Id. at 646–48. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 647. The virtual-child defense derives from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
75. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253–55 (invalidating statute that prohibited possession of digitally 
created images of minors—or persons who appear to be minors—engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct); see also Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 647. 
76. Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 647–48. 
77. Id. at 647. 
78. Id. 
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limitations.79 
The government failed to rebut any of the experts’ testimony and 
offered no evidence of its own during the hearing.80 The court held that 
given the uncontested testimony, the defense was entitled to a copy of 
the materials.81 Specifically, the court found that the experts were a 
necessary component of Knellinger’s virtual-child defense.82 The court, 
however, made its discovery order conditional on Knellinger hiring an 
expert to perform the examination described above, reasoning, “The 
record establishes that a copy of the hard drive is of no use to the 
defense unless there is a defense expert to examine the copy.”83 
Similarly, the defendant in Tummins provided almost un-rebutted 
expert testimony that the limitations under § 3509(m) prohibited his 
expert from completing an analysis of the pornographic evidence.84 The 
defendant here, however, had actually retained an expert who testified 
that his company was unwilling to leave its software running overnight 
in a government facility.85 In light of the largely uncontested testimony, 
the court compelled disclosure of the materials to the defense.86 
Considered together, these cases show that a combination of the 
following factors undermines the government’s ability to afford a 
defendant ample opportunity to examine the materials in preparation for 
trial: the defendant demonstrates that a copy is essential for a virtual-
child defense;87 the defendant has retained an expert;88 the defendant’s 
                                                     
79. Id. at 647–48. 
80. Id. at 646 (“The United States presented no evidence.”); id. at 646 n.5 (“If the United States 
had wanted to challenge the substantive testimony of these two experts, it could have put on 
testimony from its own experts. The United States chose not to do so.”); id. at 648 (“In sum, 
Knellinger’s witnesses established that assessment and presentation of a viable legal defense in 
Knellinger’s case requires expert analysis and testimony . . . . The United States presented no 
witnesses or other evidence to controvert that offered by Knellinger.”); id. at 649 (“Considering the 
testimony from the legal and technical experts in this case and the absence of any opposing 
evidence, the Court concludes that, at least in this case, the record permits no other factual 
conclusion.”) (emphasis added); id. at 649 (“Because the United States did not present evidence that 
contradicts the evidence put forth by Knellinger, and because Knellinger’s witnesses were both 
credible and relevant, the Court accepts the showing made by Knellinger’s experts . . . .”). 
81. Id. at 649–50. 
82. Id. at 649. 
83. Id. at 650. 
84. United States v. Tummins, No. 3:10–00009, 2011 WL 2078107, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. May 26, 
2011). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at *7. 
87. Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 649. 
88. Id. at 650; Tummins, 2011 WL 2078107, at *5. 
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experts testify under oath that they are unwilling to examine the 
evidence under the discovery limitations;89 and the limitations would 
subject the defendant to an exorbitant expense.90 But absent a showing 
that a copy of materials is necessary to the defense, federal courts have 
upheld the constitutionality of limiting discovery of child pornography 
evidence under the Walsh Act. 
Until 2006, the federal rules of discovery required the government to 
produce copies of child pornography evidence to the defense for trial. 
The Walsh Act altered how federal courts handle such evidence by 
prohibiting unnecessary duplication and distribution to the defense. So 
long as the materials are made reasonably available to the defense, 
federal courts have found that a defendant’s due process rights are 
sufficiently protected. However, similar to federal prosecutions before 
2006, the Washington State Supreme Court has mandated that criminal 
defendants are entitled to a copy of child pornography evidence under 
state criminal rules and under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
II. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT HAS HELD 
THAT DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY EVIDENCE 
Criminal Rule 4.7 (“CrR 4.7”) governs discovery in state criminal 
proceedings. It mandates that a prosecuting attorney disclose books, 
paper documents, photographs, or tangible objects to the defense if the 
prosecuting attorney either intends to use the materials at trial, or if the 
materials belong to the defendant.91 In 2007, the Washington State 
Supreme Court consolidated three cases involving the possession of 
child pornography in State v. Boyd92 and recognized that hard drives 
containing child pornography93 qualify as discoverable objects under 
CrR 4.7.94 There, the Court required the State to duplicate hard drives, 
                                                     
89. Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 649–50; Tummins, 2011 WL 2078107 at *5. 
90. Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 649. The expense alone, however, has been found insufficient 
to deprive the defendant of “ample opportunity.” See supra note 35; see also United States v. 
Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 617 (9th Cir. 2010). 
91. WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(a)(1)(v). 
92. 160 Wash. 2d 424, 158 P.3d 54 (2007). 
93. Washington law does not use the term “child pornography,” but rather “depictions of minor 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.040 (2010). For a 
definition of “sexually explicit conduct,” see WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.011 (2010). This 
Comment uses the terms “child pornography” and “images/depictions/photographs of minor[s] 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct” interchangeably. 
94. See Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 432, 158 P.3d at 59. 
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photographs, and videotapes that contained thousands of images of 
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and distribute the copies to 
the defendants for trial.95 Three years later, the Court reaffirmed Boyd in 
State v. Grenning.96 The Court emphasized that a defendant’s right to 
receive copies of child pornography evidence under Boyd did not hinge 
entirely on the underlying rules of procedure, but also a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel.97 
A. In State v. Boyd, the Court Held that a Criminal Defendant’s 
Rights of Due Process and Effective Representation Compel the 
Prosecution to Disclose Child Pornography Evidence Under 
CrR 4.7(a) 
In Boyd, the State charged Michael Boyd with twenty-eight crimes 
involving five identified victims, some of whom were depicted in 
hundreds of photographs.98 Along with the photographs, the State seized 
several hard drives and other storage devices in Boyd’s possession that 
contained tens of thousands of images of minors engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct.99 These images supported eleven of Boyd’s charges.100 
Before trial, the State permitted Boyd to examine the evidence in a state 
facility on only two occasions.101 Boyd moved the court under 
CrR 4.7(a) to compel the State to turn over a mirror-image copy of his 
hard drive.102 Boyd argued that he was entitled to the evidence because it 
was necessary for both his counsel’s effective representation and his 
defense.103 
The State responded that CrR 4.7(a) did not cover child pornography 
evidence, and that the trial court could deny Boyd’s discovery under 
CrR 4.7(e)—a rule which permits the trial court to balance the victims’ 
interests with the defendant’s right of discovery.104 The State argued that 
                                                     
95. Id. at 429–33, 158 P.3d at 57–59. 
96. 169 Wash. 2d 47, 234 P.3d 169 (2010). 
97. Id. at 54–55, 234 P.3d at 173–74. 
98. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 429, 158 P.3d at 57. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 429–30, 158 P.3d at 57. 
101. Id. at 430, 158 P.3d at 57. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 431, 158 P.3d at 58. 
104. Id. at 431–32, 158 P.3d at 58. CrR 4.7(a) normally requires the State to disclose materials, 
whereas CrR 4.7(e) shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate that the evidence is necessary 
to the defense: “Upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the defense, and if the request is 
reasonable, the court in its discretion may require disclosure to the defendant of the relevant 
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the disclosure requirement under CrR 4.7(a) only required 
acknowledging the existence of such evidence to the defense—not 
producing it.105 The State asserted that withholding copies of the child 
pornography protected the victims’ interests and limited further 
victimization through dissemination of the evidence.106 The Court 
disagreed, however, with only Justice James Johnson dissenting. 
The Court agreed with Boyd that CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v) controlled the 
discovery of child pornography evidence.107 The Court stated that it 
“could not be any clearer” that mirror-image copies of hard drives, 
photographs, or video tapes qualified as evidence that the State must 
disclose during discovery under CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v).108 Because CrR 4.7(e) 
refers to materials not covered by CrR 4.7(a), the Court rejected 
CrR 4.7(e)’s balancing test as inapposite in this case.109 Specifically, the 
Court focused on the plain language of the rule, stating that “the 
disclosure mandate [under CrR 4.7(a)] applies equally to all evidence” 
because “[n]o distinction is made under CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v) between the 
specific types of tangible evidence the prosecutor must disclose.”110 The 
Court also rejected the State’s definition of disclosure, relying both on 
the general usage of “to disclose,” and the underlying policies of the 
discovery rules, to show that “disclosure” meant duplication and 
dissemination.111 
Invoking the constitutional principles underlying CrR 4.7, the Court 
reasoned CrR 4.7(a) required “meaningful access” to copies of child 
pornography evidence based on a criminal defendant’s due process 
rights.112 It described “meaningful access” as disclosure that would 
“afford opportunity for effective cross-examination, and meet the 
requirements of due process.”113 In making its decision, the Court also 
focused on the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 
                                                     
material and information not covered by [CrR 4.7(a)] . . . .” WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(e)(1). 
This would have permitted the trial court to consider any potential or unnecessary embarrassment 
victims might suffer before distributing the pornography evidence to the defense. Id. 4.7(e)(2). 
105. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 432–33, 158 P.3d at 59. 
106. Id. at 433, 158 P.3d at 59. 
107. Id. at 432, 158 P.3d at 59. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 431–32, 158 P.3d at 58–59. 
110. Id. at 436, 158 P.3d at 60. 
111. See id. at 433–35, 158 P.3d 59–60. 
112. Id. at 433–35, 158 P.3d 59–60. 
113. Id. at 434, 158 P.3d at 59 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Yates, 111 Wash. 2d 793, 
797, 765 P.2d 291 (1988)). 
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counsel. It reasoned that defense counsel and experts needed a copy of 
the pornographic evidence to examine whether defendant downloaded or 
created the pornography, test the software that was used in the process, 
and analyze whether the pornography depicted actual images of children 
(as opposed to digitally manufactured images).114 As such, disclosure 
was necessary for defense counsel to satisfy its constitutional role.115 
The Court reiterated that the State had the burden of establishing the 
need for appropriate restrictions.116 The Court recognized that its holding 
“mirror[ed] the approach under federal law prior to the passage of the 
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006,” and explained 
that, even under the Walsh Act, federal courts had compelled disclosure 
in certain circumstances.117 Although the Court did not expressly hold 
that the Walsh Act did not preempt state court rules of discovery in 
criminal proceedings, at least one appellate court in Washington has 
relied on Boyd to do so.118 
The sole dissenter in Boyd, Justice J. Johnson, argued that the 
majority’s holding violated the Washington State Constitution as well as 
important public policy.119 The Washington State Constitution mandates 
that the criminal justice system afford crime victims “dignity and 
respect.”120 Justice Johnson concluded that compelling discovery of 
child pornography evidence implicated the child victim’s constitutional 
privacy rights.121 Drawing on legislative findings,122 he argued that the 
                                                     
114. Id. at 436, 158 P.3d at 60–61 (citing United States v. Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d 640, 647 
(E.D. Va. 2007)). 
115. Id. at 435, 158 P.3d at 60 (“CrR 4.7(a) obliges the prosecutor to provide copies of the 
evidence as a necessary consequence of the right to effective representation and a fair trial.”). 
116. Id. at 433–34, 158 P.3d at 59; see also WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(a)(1) (permitting the 
prosecuting attorney to limit a defendant’s access to some materials through a protective order); id. 
4.7(h)(4) (“Upon a showing of cause, the court may at any time order that specified disclosure be 
restricted or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate, provided that all material and 
information to which a party is entitled must be disclosed in time to permit the party’s counsel to 
make beneficial use thereof.”). 
117. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 433 n.4, 158 P.3d at 59 n.4 (emphasis added) (“The [Adam Walsh 
Act] altered both the burden and the standard of proof. Since its passage courts sometimes refuse to 
provide copies without also requiring government supervision.”) (citing United States v. O’Rourke, 
470 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Ariz. 2007); Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d 640). 
118. See State v. Norris, 157 Wash. App. 50, 78, 236 P.3d 225, 238 (2010) (“We hold that section 
3509(m) of the Adam Walsh Act does not preempt CrR 4.7 and that the State has an obligation to 
produce to the defense copies of the photographs it intends to use against Norris at trial.”) (citing 
Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 435, 158 P.3d at 60). 
119. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 441, 158 P.3d at 63 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 449, 158 P.3d at 67 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35). 
121. Id. at 450, 158 P.3d at 67 (citing WASH CONST. art. I, § 7). 
122. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001 (2010) (prescribing Washington’s duty towards child 
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Washington State Legislature had made the prevention of sexual 
exploitation and abuse of children a goal of “surpassing importance,” a 
public policy that could lawfully burden a criminal defendant’s right to 
discovery.123 
Justice Johnson pointed out that the federal courts had addressed these 
same problems by upholding the Walsh Act, and maintained that shifting 
the burden onto the defendant to show the necessity of receiving the 
evidence did not excessively burden the defendant’s rights.124 He further 
recognized that Arizona and California had also resolved these concerns 
by shifting the discovery burden to the defense in child pornography 
cases.125 He concluded that the defendants in Boyd had not made such a 
showing, and thus the State should have been permitted to maintain 
possession and control of the evidence.126 
B. In State v. Grenning, the Court Affirmed Its Holding in Boyd Was 
Based on Court Rules and a Criminal Defendant’s Rights to Due 
Process and Effective Representation 
Three years after Boyd, the Court in Grenning affirmed that a criminal 
defendant is entitled to a copy of child pornography evidence. The State 
of Washington charged Neil Grenning with possession of child 
                                                     
victims of sexual exploitation a “sacred trust”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69A.010 (2010) 
(finding that child victims should be treated with “sensitivity, courtesy, and special care”). 
123. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 449–50, 158 P.3d at 67 (“It is difficult to comprehend how a court 
order compelling the State to duplicate and disseminate child pornography evidence can be 
reconciled with the preservation of the State’s ‘sacred trust’ regarding child sex offense victims.”) 
(citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.96A.001). 
124. Id. at 450, 158 P.3d at 68. 
125. Id. The Arizona rules of discovery normally require full disclosure, but in cases involving 
child pornography evidence, the State is permitted to maintain possession of the materials unless: 
[R]eproduction or release is necessary to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Such a 
circumstance may be present when the items must be examined by a [sic] expert in order to 
determine whether actual minors are depicted in the materials or when a computer hard drive 
or other digital storage medium must be examined by an expert to determine whether the 
defendant was responsible . . . but only if the defendant shows that inspection of items under 
specific conditions offered by the state is not sufficient to protect the defendant’s rights to a 
fair trial. This rule does not contemplate reproduction or release of such materials simply for 
the convenience of a lawyer or other agents of a defendant. To protect the rights of potential 
victims, if reproduction or release is ordered, the court must impose restrictions . . . . 
ARIZ. R. CRIM. PROC 15.1(j) cmt. 15.1(j) (emphasis added). 
California adopted similar measures in 2003, placing the burden of necessity on the defendant: 
“[N]o attorney may disclose or permit to be disclosed to a defendant, members of the defendant’s 
family, or anyone else copies of child pornography evidence, unless specifically permitted to do so 
by the court after a hearing and a showing of good cause.” CAL. PEN. CODE § 1054.10(a) (emphasis 
added). 
126. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 450–53, 158 P.3d at 68–69. 
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pornography after discovering sexually explicit pictures of minors on his 
computer.127 After authorities seized Grenning’s hard-drives, which 
contained the child pornography, the State refused to disseminate copies 
to the defense and successfully moved the court to issue a protective 
order for the evidence.128 Grenning, his counsel, and expert witnesses 
were permitted to review the materials only in a state facility during 
business hours.129 Grenning, however, failed to retain an expert witness 
willing to review the materials under these restrictions and 
unsuccessfully moved the court to remove its protective order.130 
Grenning went to trial without an expert witness examining the hard 
drives.131 He was convicted of twenty counts of possession of child 
pornography and sentenced to 117 years in prison.132 
While Grenning’s appeal was pending, the Court announced its 
decision in Boyd.133 The court of appeals subsequently reversed 
Grenning’s child pornography charges, and the State petitioned for 
review of that decision, arguing that the State had made the materials 
available in a facility.134 The Court rejected the State’s argument, 
highlighting its holding in Boyd, and determined that CrR 4.7(a) and due 
process considerations entitled Grenning to copies of the evidence.135 
The Court reasoned that while perhaps its holding in Boyd rested on a 
violation of discovery rules, its holding was of constitutional 
magnitude.136 The Court concluded that under Boyd, “as a matter of 
                                                     
127. State v. Grenning, 169 Wash. 2d 47, 49–50, 234 P.3d 169, 171 (2010). Grenning was 
charged with seventy-two counts of child sex crimes, including rape of a child, sexual exploitation 
of a minor, child molestation, and possession of child pornography. Id. 
128. Id. at 50, 234 P.3d at 171. 
129. Id. at 50 n.1. 
130. Id. at 50–52, 234 P.3d at 171–72. 
131. Id. at 52, 234 P.3d at 172. 
132. Id. Grenning’s child pornography convictions were only a minor fraction of his overall 
sentence. Grenning was convicted of seventy-one total counts, and sentenced to a total of 117 years 
in prison. He was sentenced to one year for each charge of child pornography, all to be served 
concurrently. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 52–53, 234 P.3d at 172. 
135. Id. at 53–60, 234 P.3d at 172–77. 
136. Id. at 55, 234 P.3d at 174 (“Nothing in our reasoning in Boyd turned on its procedural 
posture.”); id. at 58 (“While it is true that Boyd rested on a violation of a court rule, we found that 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were implicated . . . .”); id. at 54–55, 234 P.3d at 173–74 (“We 
also concluded [in Boyd] that denying defense counsel such potentially critical exculpatory evidence 
went beyond merely violating the court rule and had constitutional implications: ‘Courts have long 
recognized that effective assistance of counsel . . . [is a] crucial element[] of due process and the 
right to a fair trial.’”) (quoting State v. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d 424, 434, 158 P.3d 54, 60 (2007)). 
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law . . . adequate representation requires providing a ‘mirror image’ of 
[the] hard drive.”137 According to the Court, only after receiving a 
mirror-image copy of the hard drive could the defense and experts 
determine whether the materials contained any exculpatory evidence.138 
Strongly disagreeing that Grenning’s constitutional rights were 
implicated, Chief Justice Barbara Madsen drafted a lengthy dissenting 
opinion, to which Justices J. Johnson and Gerry Alexander concurred.139 
The dissent contended that Grenning’s constitutional rights should not 
have factored into the majority’s analysis because the State had provided 
Grenning an adequate opportunity to review the evidence prior to trial.140 
The dissenters argued that the State’s actions comported with the 
underlying principles of CrR 4.7(a).141 Similar to Justice Johnson’s 
dissent in Boyd, Chief Justice Madsen pointed to the Walsh Act in 
support of limiting a defendant’s access to child pornography 
evidence.142 She wrote: 
Given [the Walsh Act], whether a constitutional violation exists 
in a particular case is essentially determined by asking whether 
the defendant has been denied reasonable access to the evidence 
in a child pornography case. Comparison to federal cases in the 
context of the Adam Walsh Act on this analogous point shows 
that Grenning had more than an adequate opportunity to engage 
in discovery.143 
The dissent pointed out that Grenning had failed altogether to show why 
receiving a copy of the child pornography evidence was necessary to his 
defense, reasoning that his defense did not require a substantial 
examination of the evidence (whereas in other cases an expert might be 
necessary to determine whether the children depicted in the pornography 
are digitally created).144 
                                                     
137. Id. at 58, 234 P.3d at 175 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
138. Id. at 55, 234 P.3d at 174. 
139. Id. at 61–62, 234 P.3d at 177. 
140. Id. at 73–77, 234 P.3d at 182–85. 
141. See id. at 61–81, 234 P.3d at 177–86. 
142. Id. at 71–72, 234 P.3d at 182 (“The potential for repeated victimization of the children 
whose images are child pornography stored on computer hard drives was a legitimate basis for the 
trial judges in this case to issue the protective order and to deny the defendant’s motion for 
reconsideration. Not only was this true as a general proposition, it was true based on the specific 
facts of this case.”). The Chief Justice referenced more than ten cases—among others—in which 
federal courts had upheld the constitutionality of the Walsh Act’s limitations on discovery of child 
pornography evidence. Id. at 74, 234 P.3d at 184. 
143. Id. at 74–75, 234 P.3d at 184 (emphasis added). 
144. Id. at 66–67, 234 P.3d at 179–80. 
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Finally, Chief Justice Madsen explained that her opinion comported 
with the Court’s holding in Boyd, where she had concurred with the 
majority, because the constitutional underpinnings of effective trial 
preparation and adequate legal representation under CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v) 
were satisfied in Grenning’s case.145 Boyd had been permitted to review 
the evidence on only two occasions before trial, whereas Grenning had 
had unrestricted access to the materials in the state facility.146 
Under Boyd and Grenning, the Washington State Supreme Court 
aligned the state’s discovery rules in accordance with federal discovery 
rules pre-2006. The status of Washington’s discovery rules, however, 
recently changed when the State Legislature responded to the Court’s 
decisions in Boyd and Grenning by enacting H.B. 2177. The newly 
enacted statute limits a criminal defendant’s access to child pornography 
evidence—similar to the Walsh Act—and prohibits unnecessary 
duplication and redistribution to protect the rights of child victims. 
III. THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE RESPONDED TO 
BOYD AND GRENNING BY ENACTING H.B. 2177 
In 2012 the Washington State Legislature unanimously enacted 
H.B. 2177.147 The bill amends current state legislative findings on child 
pornography148 to include findings similar to those of the Walsh Act and 
prefaces those findings with a statement that “the importance of 
protecting children from repeat exploitation in child pornography is not 
being given sufficient weight under [Boyd and Grenning].”149 The 
legislation proceeds to outline the importance of protecting children 
from further exploitation based on the following findings: 
(1) Child pornography is not entitled to protection under the 
First Amendment and thus may be prohibited; 
(2) The state has a compelling interest in protecting children 
from those who sexually exploit them, and this interest extends 
to stamping out the vice of child pornography at all levels in the 
distribution chain; 
                                                     
145. Id. at 80, 234 P.3d at 186 (arguing that because the State made the evidence available to the 
defense upon request at a state facility, defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated). 
146. Id. at 68–69, 234 P.3d at 180–81. 
147. Substitute H.B. 2177, Chapter 135, Laws 2012, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012); see 
also History of H.B. 2177, WASH. ST. LEGISLATURE, http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/ 
summary.aspx?bill=2177 (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). 
148. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001 (2012). 
149. Id. 
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(3) Every instance of viewing images of child pornography 
represents a renewed violation of the privacy of the victims and 
a repetition of their abuse; 
(4) Child pornography constitutes prima facie contraband, and 
as such should not be distributed to, or copied by, child 
pornography defendants or their attorneys; 
(5) It is imperative to prohibit the reproduction of child 
pornography in criminal cases so as to avoid repeated violation 
and abuse of victims, so long as the government makes 
reasonable accommodations for the inspection, viewing, and 
examination of such material for the purposes of mounting a 
criminal defense. The legislature is also aware that the [Walsh 
Act] prohibits the duplication and distribution of child 
pornography as part of the discovery process in federal 
prosecutions. This federal law has been in effect since 2006, and 
upheld repeatedly as constitutional. Courts interpreting the 
Walsh Act have found that such limitations can be employed 
while still providing the defendant due process. The Legislature 
joins Congress, and the legislatures of other states that have 
passed similar provisions, in protecting these child victims so 
that our justice system does not cause repeat exploitation, while 
still providing due process to criminal defendants.150 
Using these findings, H.B. 2177 prescribes how child pornography 
evidence should be handled in criminal prosecutions under several 
statutes.151 One of these statutes, RCW 9.68A.170, provides: 
(1) In any criminal proceeding, any property or material that 
constitutes [child pornography] shall remain in the care, custody, 
and control of either a law enforcement agency or the court. 
(2) Despite any request by the defendant or prosecution, any 
property or material that constitutes [child pornography] shall 
not be copied, photographed, duplicated, or otherwise 
reproduced, so long as the property or material is made 
reasonably available to the parties . . . .152 
Similar to the Walsh Act, RCW 9.68A.170 defines evidence as 
“reasonably available” when the prosecution, defense, or other expert 
has had “ample opportunity for inspection, viewing, and examination of 
the property or material at a law enforcement facility or a neutral facility 
                                                     
150. Id. 
151. See H.B. 2177, §§ 2–4. 
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.170(2). 
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approved by the court upon petition by the defense.”153 
If necessary to the defense, RCW 9.68A.170 also permits the court to 
order the production of a mirror-image copy of the evidence to an expert 
who: (1) has actually been retained by a party; and (2) is prepared to 
conduct a forensic examination of the evidence while it is located in a 
designated facility.154 The party seeking a copy of the materials must 
make a “substantial showing” that an analysis cannot be conducted in 
such a facility.155 Any disclosure is subject to a protective order against 
further distribution.156 Other provisions in RCW 9.68A.170 require 
criminal defendants to review the evidence while in the presence of their 
attorney, and allow the court to appoint someone to supervise a pro se 
defendant’s examination of the evidence.157 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE BOYD AND GRENNING 
AND UPHOLD RCW 9.68A.170, WHICH BALANCES THE 
RIGHTS OF CHILD VICTIMS AND DEFENDANTS 
Given the many challenges to the validity of the Walsh Act in federal 
court,158 it seems likely the Washington State Supreme Court will hear 
challenges to RCW 9.68A.170 in the near future. This statute respects 
the constitutional policies underlying CrR 4.7(a), which the Court sought 
to protect in Boyd and Grenning, and furthers the Legislature’s goal of 
protecting children against repeated exploitation. In future cases, the 
Court should uphold the law as facially constitutional, and overrule its 
decisions in Boyd and Grenning.159 
A. RCW 9.68A.170 Creates an Express Exception to the State’s Duty 
of Disclosure Under CrR 4.7(a) 
The most apparent reason why the Court should reconsider its 
holdings in Boyd and Grenning is because RCW 9.68A.170 alters the 
underlying discovery rules under which those cases were decided. The 
                                                     
153. Id. 
154. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.170(4). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.170(3). 
158. See supra Part I.B. 
159. This Comment’s argument is limited to a challenge against the constitutionality of WASH. 
REV. CODE §9.68A.170 as pertaining to a defendant’s state and federal due process rights, and Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because these are the bases for the Court’s 
holdings in Boyd and Grenning. 
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statute fundamentally changes how child pornography evidence should 
be handled in criminal prosecutions in several important ways. First, the 
statute creates an express exception to the rules of discovery by 
prohibiting the reproduction of pornography evidence “[d]espite any 
request by the defendant or prosecution.”160 This prohibition is akin to 
the Walsh Act’s exception, and sweeps broadly enough to encompass all 
discovery requests. Thus, despite the normal rules of discovery under 
CrR 4.7, RCW 9.68A.170 provides an express exception to the State’s 
duty to disclose child pornography evidence. 
Next, the statute shifts custody of the child pornography evidence 
from the prosecution to the court or other law enforcement agency. 
CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v) assumes that the prosecution has unimpeded access to 
the materials in order to copy and distribute them. But RCW 9.68A.170 
prohibits even the prosecution from obtaining copies of the materials.161 
This change should alleviate the Court’s concern in Boyd that the 
prosecution is otherwise being afforded an unfair advantage during 
discovery.162 The statute specifically requires courts to deny any request 
for child pornography materials from either party—even the 
prosecution.163 
A change in the underlying court rules does not necessarily shield the 
statute from constitutional challenges. The Court held in Boyd and 
Grenning that denying defendant meaningful access to the evidence 
went beyond a mere violation of the court rules and implicated the 
defendant’s rights to due process and effective representation.164 
Nonetheless, the underlying court rule—CrR 4.7(a)—guided the court’s 
opinion, and has undergone significant changes by the Legislature. 
While perhaps the language from the rules of discovery was not the 
deciding factor in Boyd and Grenning, it was a major factor that 
established the framework for those opinions. 
                                                     
160. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.170(2). 
161. Child pornography “shall remain in the care, custody, and control of either a law 
enforcement agency or the court.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.170(1) (emphasis added). 
162. See State v. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d 424, 433–34, 158 P.3d 54, 59–60 (2007) (noting that the 
principles underlying CrR 4.7 require an even playing field during discovery). 
163. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.170(2). 
164. In Grenning, the Court reiterated that the State’s failure to distribute copies of child 
pornography evidence in Boyd “went beyond merely violating the court rule and had constitutional 
implications.” 169 Wash. 2d 47, 54–55, 234 P.3d 169, 173 (2010); see also supra note 136 and 
accompanying text. 
Willmore -FINAL-with corrected title.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/26/2012  6:38 PM 
2012] PROTECTING CHILD VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 907 
 
B. H.B. 2177’s Legislative Findings Support a Reconsideration of 
Boyd and Grenning 
The amended legislative findings to Washington’s child pornography 
laws provide the support necessary for the Washington State Supreme 
Court to reconsider its holdings in Boyd and Grenning. The majority in 
Grenning hinted that it might be open to reconsidering its decision in 
Boyd if the record and argument before it supported doing so.165 In light 
of the amended findings under H.B. 2177, the Court must now consider 
the State’s “compelling interest” in eliminating child pornography 
because every viewing of child pornography constitutes a violation of 
the victim’s constitutional right to privacy.166 
The State argued in Grenning that it did not have to redistribute the 
child pornography evidence under the pre-H.B. 2177 discovery rules—
an argument the Court reiterated it rejected in Boyd.167 But now the 
Court has the Legislature’s express intent “to prohibit the reproduction 
of child pornography in criminal cases so as to avoid repeated violation 
and abuse of victims,” while still complying with a defendant’s due 
process rights.168 In light of the Legislature’s resolve to stamp out 
reproduction of child pornography, these precise and unequivocal 
statements should compel the Court to carefully reconsider its holdings 
in Boyd and Grenning. 
C. RCW 9.68A.170’s “Reasonably Available” and “Ample 
Opportunity” Clauses Protect a Criminal Defendant’s State and 
Federal Rights to Due Process and Effective Representation 
The limitation on a defendant’s discovery rights under 
RCW 9.68A.170 should pass constitutional muster, both facial and as-
applied, because the statute’s plain meaning directs that Washington 
criminal defendants receive at least due-process-level access to child 
pornography evidence. By its own terms, RCW 9.68A.170 requires that 
child pornography evidence be “reasonably available,” such that the 
parties and otherwise qualified experts have “ample opportunity” to 
                                                     
165. Id. at 55 n.6, 234 P.3d at 174 n.6 (“The dissent would have us revisit [Boyd’s] test, on the 
unquestionable grounds that child pornography is a terrible thing. However, the record and 
argument before us does not support taking that step.”) (emphasis added)). 
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001 (Findings 2–4). 
167. Grenning, 169 Wash. 2d at 55, 234 P.3d at 174 (quoting Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 436, 158 
P.3d at 61). 
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001 (Finding 5). 
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review the materials in preparation for trial.169 Federal courts have found 
that this language satisfies due process, and there is no reason the 
Washington State Supreme Court should hold differently.170 Moreover, 
RCW 9.68A.170 arguably goes further than § 3509(m) of the Walsh Act 
in protecting defendant’s due process rights because it permits the court 
to approve a “neutral facility” instead of a law enforcement facility for 
review of the evidence.171 This creates a more even playing field during 
the discovery process between both parties. 
It is important to note that the statute does not obstruct a defendant’s 
access to the child pornography evidence altogether. Rather, it shifts the 
burden onto the party requesting the materials to retain an expert and 
make a “substantial showing” that the expert’s analysis cannot be 
completed in a government facility or court.172 Statutorily shifting the 
discovery burden onto a criminal defendant is nothing new under 
Washington discovery rules. For example, CrR 4.7(e) requires the 
defendant to make a showing of materiality to his or her defense before 
receiving material not covered by the other discovery rules.173 Because 
RCW 9.68A.170 merely burdens the defendant’s right to access child 
pornography evidence without completely denying access, it is difficult 
to see how the statute is unconstitutional on its face when it affords a 
defendant due-process-level access. 
One should not infer from Boyd that the Court was applying a broader 
due process standard under the state constitution than the federal due 
process standard. When addressing Boyd’s rights of due process and 
effective representation, the Court did not reference any authority to 
support or otherwise indicate that a criminal defendant in Washington is 
somehow entitled to broader due process rights under the state 
constitution.174 On the contrary, Washington precedent shows that due 
process is a flexible concept governed by the particular circumstances of 
the crime.175 Absent the Court’s departure from the federal courts’ 
application of due process in the context of child pornography evidence, 
it seems appropriate that the Court strongly consider the federal courts’ 
                                                     
169. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.68A.170(1)–(2). 
170. See supra Part I.B. 
171. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.170(2). 
172. Id. § 9.68A.170(4). 
173. See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(e)(1). Unlike CrR 4.7(a), which governs discovery of 
tangible materials, CrR 4.7(e) regulates discovery of other evidence, such as witness interviews. 
174. See State v. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d 424, 433–35, 158 P.3d 54, 59–60 (2007). 
175. See, e.g., In re Det. of Stout, 159 Wash. 2d 357, 370, 150 P.3d 86, 93 (2007) (finding that 
due-process’ “minimum requirements depend on what is fair in a particular context”). 
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unanimity in approving discovery limitations under the Walsh Act when 
it construes RCW 9.68A.170.176 
Further, the linchpin of the Court’s reasoning in Boyd was that 
limitations on CrR 4.7(a) might prevent a defendant from adequately 
preparing a defense,177 but this concern is no longer well-founded in 
light of RCW 9.68A.170’s “reasonably available” and “ample 
opportunity” clauses. The Walsh Act’s identical provisions have 
consistently survived constitutional scrutiny.178 When the Court 
construes RCW 9.68A.170’s clauses to determine whether they comport 
with due process, it will find itself—as have the federal courts—
interpreting “ample opportunity.” Like the federal courts, the 
Washington State Supreme Court is likely to find that this phrase means 
“a more than adequate opportunity to inspect, view, and examine the 
evidence in question.”179 Surely a “more than adequate opportunity” to 
examine child pornography evidence would ensure the defendant a right 
to adequately prepare a defense. 
This conclusion should satisfy the Court’s meaningful access 
requirement under Boyd.180 What the Court has termed “meaningful 
access” can more properly be understood as what the federal courts have 
                                                     
176. In State v. Turner, 145 Wash. App. 899, 187 P.3d 835 (2008), the Washington Court of 
Appeals found that a defendant’s due process rights under the Washington State Constitution were 
equal to his rights under the federal constitution. Id. at 909–10, 187 P.3d at 839–40. Furthermore, in 
order to extend the protections afforded under the Washington State Constitution, the Court would 
have to apply the Gunwall factors under State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). 
See Turner, 145 Wash. App. at 909–10, 187 P.3d at 839–40. 
177. The Court stated in Boyd: 
[G]iven the nature of the evidence, adequate representation requires providing a ‘mirror 
image’ of that hard drive; enabling the defense attorney to consult with computer experts 
who can tell how the evidence made its way onto the computer. Forensic review might 
show that someone other than the defendant caused certain images to be downloaded. It 
may indicate when the images were downloaded. It may reveal how often and how recently 
images were viewed and other useful information based on where the images are stored on 
the device. Expert analysis of the application or program used to acquire the images may 
be useful. Providing a copy enables the expert to test that application or program using the 
same type and version of computer operating system as was used by the defendant, a 
difference that may alter how the program runs, stores data, and so forth. Analysis may 
also reveal that the images are not of children. This analysis requires greater access than 
can be afforded in the State’s facility.  
Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 436, 158 P.3d at 60–61 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
178. See supra Part I.B. 
179. See, e.g., United States v. O’Rourke, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1056 (D. Ariz. 2007). 
180. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 433–35, 158 P.3d at 59 (“The evident purpose of the disclosure 
requirement is to protect the defendant’s interests in getting meaningful access to evidence 
supporting the criminal charges in order to effectively prepare for trial and provide adequate 
representation.”) (emphasis added). 
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labeled “due-process-level access.” This reasoning in part persuaded 
Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Alexander to side against the majority 
with Justice J. Johnson in the Grenning dissent.181 The dissent pointed 
out that Grenning had meaningful access to the evidence because the 
State had provided him the opportunity (arguably ample opportunity) to 
examine the evidence.182 Using this reasoning, Chief Justice Madsen 
distinguished the Court’s opinion in Boyd where the Court held that 
Boyd had been constructively denied meaningful access to the 
evidence.183 In essence, her argument seems to apply an ample 
opportunity analysis long before H.B. 2177’s enactment. 
The dissent in Grenning also properly recognized that a defendant 
cannot be denied effective representation when defense counsel has been 
given meaningful access (ample opportunity) to the evidence.184 
Although the Grenning and Boyd majorities found that effective 
representation necessitated a copy of the evidence, Chief Justice 
Madsen’s argument in Grenning is logically compelling: put simply, a 
defendant cannot claim he was denied effective representation where his 
counsel has had a more than adequate opportunity to examine the child 
pornography evidence before trial.185 How can counsel be per se 
ineffective when afforded an ample opportunity to review the evidence? 
Claims regarding a criminal defendant’s effective representation are thus 
better considered under the due process framework. 
The Boyd and Grenning majorities put the cart before the horse by 
adopting a per se rule that meaningful access can never be limited 
access.186 No matter the purported defense to the charges, and without a 
showing of any actual need to review the evidence, the Court found that 
copying and disseminating the evidence was necessary to the defense. In 
light of RCW 9.68A.170’s standards and its federal counterpart, this 
conclusion is unreasonable. Interestingly, in arriving at its conclusions in 
Boyd, the Court relied in part on Knellinger—one of the only cases that 
has compelled discovery—to show why the defense might need a copy 
                                                     
181. See supra Part II.B. 
182. State v. Grenning, 169 Wash. 2d 47, 63–68, 79–80, 234 P.3d 169, 178–80 (2010) (Madsen, 
C.J., dissenting) (disputing the majority’s factual findings that Grenning could not retain an expert, 
asserting that absolutely nothing in the record supported the factual findings). 
183. See id. at 68, 234 P.3d at 180. 
184. Id. at 74, 234 P.3d at 183 (following the federal court reasoning that a claimed violation of 
the right of effective representation should be considered under the “due process umbrella”). 
185. Id. 
186. Grenning, 169 Wash. 2d at 54, 234 P.3d at 173 (quoting State v. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d 424, 
433, 158 P.3d 54, 59 (2007)). 
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of child pornography evidence.187 By citing this authority as partial 
justification for compelling discovery, however, the Court overlooked 
the crux of the Knellinger decision: the Knellinger court found the 
Walsh Act constitutional both facially and as applied.188 Moreover, in 
Knellinger, the defendant asserted a virtual-child defense, the 
government failed to rebut any of the defense experts’ testimony, and the 
court refused to compel discovery until the defendant had actually 
retained an expert to conduct the analysis necessary for a virtual-child 
defense.189 The circumstances in Knellinger were truly exceptional. 
Other federal courts have expressly distanced themselves from the 
Knellinger opinion.190 
H.B. 2177 demonstrates the Legislature’s concern for criminal 
defendants’ due process rights. In laying out its dual objectives of 
shielding victims of child pornography against repeat exploitation and 
protecting a criminal defendant’s rights, the Legislature was clear it 
intended to properly balance the two. According to the Legislature, the 
limitations on discovery of child pornography evidence could be 
employed “while still providing due process to criminal defendants.”191 
The statute aligns Washington’s discovery rules more closely to the 
federal rules regarding discovery of child pornography evidence. 
Because those federal rules have already withstood thorough 
constitutional scrutiny, there is little reason why the Washington State 
Supreme Court should deviate in its result when reconsidering its 
holdings in Boyd and Grenning. 
                                                     
187. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 436, 158 P.3d at 60–61. 
188. United States v. Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644–46 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
189. See supra Part I.B.2. 
190. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 616 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that Knellinger 
is “easily distinguishable”); United States v. Hornback, 2010 WL 4628944, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 8, 
2010) (distinguishing Knellinger because the defense expert did not testify that moving his own 
equipment into the government facility was essential to the defense); United States v. Patt, 2008 WL 
2915433, at *20–21 (W.D.N.Y. July 24, 2008) (requiring defendant to pursue a virtual-child defense 
before considering compelling discovery); United States v. Flinn, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1102 (E.D. 
Cal. 2007) (distinguishing Knellinger by requiring an expert to be retained before testifying at the 
evidentiary hearing, refusing an expert’s “guesstimation” on how much it would cost defendant, and 
rejecting financial difficulties as a burden on due process); United States v. Spivack, 528 F. Supp. 
2d 103, 107–08 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that even the Knellinger court recognized that whether a 
defendant is afforded due process must be analyzed on a case-by-case inquiry). 
191. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001 (2012). 
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D. Public Policy and Other Provisions of the Washington State 
Constitution Provide Greater Protections for Child Crime Victims, 
Such that Reasonable Burdens on a Defendant’s Access to Child 
Pornography Evidence Should Be Permitted 
Washington public policy strongly supports protecting the rights of 
child pornography victims against unnecessary dissemination of 
pornographic evidence. The Legislature has expressly stated it intends to 
protect crime victims in general by honoring and protecting their 
rights.192 Specifically, child victims are to be treated “with sensitivity, 
courtesy, and special care,” and their rights should also be protected “in 
a manner no less vigorous than the protection afforded the . . . criminal 
defendant.”193 Even the state constitution ensures that the victim should 
be accorded “due dignity and respect.”194 As Justice J. Johnson correctly 
asserted, “[t]o order duplication and dissemination of child pornography 
evidence in a child sex offense trial affords the child victim neither 
dignity nor respect.”195 
Sadly, the Boyd majority downplayed the risk of further trauma to 
victims of child pornography through dissemination of the pornographic 
evidence, calling it merely an “attendant consequence of trial.”196 
However, the Court should now consider that RCW 9.68A.170 ensures 
that dissemination occurs only when necessary—after the defense makes 
such a showing. Thus, while the Court might be correct to assert that 
child victims will inevitably experience some embarrassment during the 
prosecution of child pornography cases, the Court now has a means of 
bolstering the statutory and constitutional protections afforded child 
victims in Washington State. 
The Court has recognized that a victim’s constitutional rights must be 
harmonized with a criminal defendant’s rights.197 When interpreting 
Article I, § 35 of the Washington State Constitution, which assures 
crime victims “due dignity and respect,” the Court has broadly stated 
that the article’s language “is without exception.”198 When considering 
                                                     
192. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69.010. 
193. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69A.010. 
194. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
195. State v. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d 424, 449, 158 P.3d 54, 67 (2007) (Johnson, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
196. Id. at 440, 158 P.3d at 62. 
197. See State v. Gentry, 125 Wash. 2d 570, 626, 888 P.2d 1105, 1138 (1995) (affirming a 
victim’s right to introduce a victim impact statement during the penalty phase in a capital case). 
198. Id. at 628, 888 P.2d at 1140. 
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that RCW 9.68A.170 guarantees a defendant constitutionally sufficient 
access to child pornography evidence, the Court should accommodate 
the special rights of child victims in these limited circumstances. 
Finally, as Justice J. Johnson pointed out in his Boyd dissent,199 
Article I, § 7 of the Washington State Constitution200 affords citizens 
substantially greater privacy protections than the Federal Constitution.201 
This right of privacy must be protected and honored “no less 
vigorous[ly]” than the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.202 
The Court should heavily weigh how RCW 9.68A.170 properly balances 
the competing constitutional protections at play when it reconsiders its 
decisions in Boyd and Grenning. 
CONCLUSION 
When RCW 9.68A.170 is challenged, the Washington State Supreme 
Court should uphold the statute and overrule its decisions in Boyd and 
Grenning. Child victims depicted in child pornography are not being 
protected from repeat exploitation or unnecessary embarrassment under 
the Court’s decisions. The Court has recognized that its decision in 
Boyd—and later affirmed in Grenning—aligned Washington State’s 
criminal discovery rules with pre-2006 federal discovery rules. 
However, the Washington State Legislature recently altered the 
underlying court rules of discovery under H.B. 2177 in the context of 
child pornography evidence, according state discovery rules with federal 
discovery rules under the Walsh Act. 
The Court should uphold RCW 9.68A.170 against both facial and as-
applied challenges because the statute—similar to its federal counterpart, 
the Walsh Act—ensures a defendant has at least due-process-level 
access to examine child pornography evidence before trial. By its own 
terms, RCW 9.68A.170’s ample opportunity standard requires the 
defense to have a more than adequate opportunity to review the 
evidence. To prevent improper duplication and distribution of child 
                                                     
199. Boyd, 160 Wash. 2d at 450, 158 P.3d at 67. 
200. “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs . . . without authority of law.” WASH. 
CONST. art. I, § 7. 
201. For a general discussion on Washington’s heightened privacy protections under the 
constitution, compare State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (invalidating a 
police search of a defendant’s trash for narcotics because a defendant has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy), with a similar case before the Supreme Court of the United States, California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (finding that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his or her trash). 
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69A.010 (2010). 
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pornography evidence, the statute requires a party to make a substantial 
showing that a copy of the evidence is essential. Otherwise, the materials 
remain safely within the custody of the court or law enforcement agency. 
The Court’s per se ruling under Boyd and Grenning is no longer 
persuasive. RCW 9.68A.170 properly balances a criminal defendant’s 
constitutional rights of due process and effective assistance of counsel 
with Washington State’s goals of protecting children and combating 
child pornography. The Court should follow the reasoning of the federal 
courts, which have unanimously upheld facial and as-applied challenges 
to similar discovery limitations under the Walsh Act. The unanimity of 
the federal courts is instructive. 
Public policy and other provisions of the Washington State 
Constitution also provide compelling support for overruling Boyd and 
Grenning. The Legislature’s amended findings regarding the vice of 
child pornography present the Court with a strong argument to stamp out 
the duplication and distribution of child pornography wherever possible. 
Moreover, by overruling its decisions in Boyd and Grenning, the Court 
will finally supply meaning to provisions in the Washington State 
Constitution and other statutes aimed at protecting victims’ rights—
rights that should be protected no less vigorously than a criminal 
defendant’s. 
 
 
